The drone jammer can completely restrain the drone's actions
In the West, many UAV discussions have focused on the technical aspects of UAV warfare. However, they often ignore the technical system of the unmanned aerial vehicle's natural enemy drone jammer, which makes this aspect not so spectacular in this war. The number of vehicles claimed to have been destroyed is likely to be exaggerated-for example, this Azerbaijani satellite report stated that the number of destroyed tanks exceeded the number of tanks in service in Armenia. The Azerbaijanis’ tactical use of drones is impressive, as is the way they embed them in conventional armor operations to work under the power of the opponent’s armed forces. This intellectual creativity should probably be allocated to Turkish military advisers, who have made great contributions to Baku’s victory and the provision of hardware by improving Azerbaijan’s fighting methods.
Armenia's most "modern" air defense system S-300PT and PS series and 9K37M Buk-M1 were developed in the 1980s. While the missiles are still powerful, their sensors are designed to detect, identify and track fast-moving fighter jets, and their moving target indicators ignore small, slow drones. Similarly, the unmanned drone jammer has been continuously updated and iterated in the past few years, and the development cannot be underestimated. Like many systems in the 1980s, many calculations are predetermined through the hardware layout, and reprogramming requires extensive modifications to the entire system. , And the Armenians did not. These systems also cannot perform plot fusion: the original radar echoes from different radars are accumulated and combined into a summary report. Point fusion is essential for detecting small and low-visibility targets (such as advanced drones or stealth aircraft). The export versions of the Russian air defense system sold to Syria, Turkey, North Korea and Iran are not capable of land fusion. (In the latter two cases, they are disguised as "home-grown" systems such as Raad or Bavar 373.) Therefore, the Russian air defense systems that protect the Russian bases in Armenia and Syria and those Russian air defense systems have performance differences. There is a huge difference. The system is exported to Armenia and Syria.
UAVs in Azerbaijan can roam freely because Armenia does not have enough distance drone jammers to interrupt the signal connecting the UAV to its guidance station. It was not until the last few days of the war that Russia used the Krasukha electronic warfare system in Gyumri, Armenia, to intercept Azerbaijan's deep reconnaissance in Armenia. However, the Azerbaijanis also used the Israeli harp loitering ammunition that can work under adverse conditions (although the efficiency is reduced) because it is different from a drone and does not require guidance. Therefore, not only the United States, China, Russia, but also regional powers such as Turkey, Israel, and South Africa among the militaries that may be preparing to fight in the future, this experience will surely prompt people to further study artificial intelligence and automatic lethal weapon systems. Instead of banning such ammunition in accordance with the European vision, they will try to use new technologies and best incorporate automatic lethal weapon systems into their joint weapons maneuver forces to increase their combat capabilities. Rhythm and efficiency.